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TURNER v. SAFLEY:




Prisoners are individuals that many of us would simply rather not
think about. They have violated the rules that hold together the fabric of
our society. When we are asked to treat them fairly, and provide them
their basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution, many of us become
morally outraged. The real test for any truly civilized society, however,
is how it treats those it views as its outcasts. As Justice Brennan has
stated:
It is... easy to think of prisoners as members of a separate
netherworld, driven by its own demands, ordered by its own
customs, ruled by those whose claim to power rests on raw ne-
cessity. Nothing can change the fact, however, that the society
that these prisoners inhabit is our own. Prisons may exist on
the margins of that society, but no act of will can sever them
from the body politic. When prisoners emerge from the
shadows to press a constitutional claim, they invoke no alien set
of principles drawn from a distant culture. Rather, they speak
the language of the charter upon which all of us rely to hold
official power accountable. They ask us to acknowledge that
power exercised in the shadows must be restrained at least as
diligently as power that acts in the sunlight.'
In Turner v. Safley,2 the United States Supreme Court promulgated
a new "reasonableness" standard by which prisoners' constitutional
claims will be judged. The Court held that a prison regulation is consti-
tutionally valid if it reasonably relates to a legitimate penological objec-
tive.3 The Turner test is of monumental significance as it applies to all
cases where prisoners assert that a penal regulation has violated their
constitutional rights, regardless of the type or degree of the deprivation.4
This Note explores the standard promulgated in Turner. The Au-
thor then analyzes the application of the Turner standard in several post-
1. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
3. Id. at 2261.
4. Id. at 2262.
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Turner cases. Finally, this Note examines the future viability of the Tur-
ner reasonableness test and proposes an alternative test.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The controversy in Turner v. Safley 5 arose from two prison regula-
tions in effect at Renz Correctional Institute [Renz], a state prison lo-
cated in Cedar City, Missouri.6 The first regulation prohibited inmates
at one prison from writing to inmates of another.7 This rule provided an
exception for "correspondence 'with immediate family members who
[were] inmates in other correctional institutions,' and.., correspondence
'concerning legal matters.' "8 Correspondence sent to inmates other than
family members was allowed only if a specially assigned "classification/
treatment team" determined that the communication would be "benefi-
cial" for all parties involved.9
The second regulation prohibited inmates from marrying other in-
mates or civilians, unless they had the express permission of the prison
superintendent. 10 The superintendent was to permit marriage only
"'when theie [were] compelling reasons to do so.' "II
A group of prisoners at Renz, in conjunction with others affected by
the prison regulations, brought a class action against the state prison for
both injunctive relief and damages.' 2 The prisoners claimed that the reg-
5. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
6. Id. at 2257. The prison was originally built as a minimum security prison, thus it has
no guard towers or walls. Id. at 2257-58. It houses both males and females; most of the males
are minimum security inmates and most of the females are either medium or maximum secur-
ity inmates. Id. at 2257. The two rules under scrutiny in Turner were promulgated by the
Missouri Division of Corrections, and were in effect at all prisons within its jurisdiction. Id.
This suit focused on the application of the rules to the Renz facility. Id.
7. Id. at 2258.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Brief for Appellants at 34, Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Nos. 84-1827, 84-2337)). "Trial testimony indicated that as a matter of practice, the determi-
nation whether to permit inmates to correspond was based on team members' familiarity with
the progress reports, conduct violations, and psychological reports in the inmates' files rather
than on individual review of each piece of mail." Id. At Renz, however, the district court
found that all inmates were flatly denied the right to correspond with inmates who were not
family members. Id. (citing Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 591 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
10. Id. (citing Brief for Appellants at 47, Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Nos. 841827, 84-2337)).
11. Id. (citing Brief for Appellants at 47, Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Nos. 84-1827, 84-2337)). Prison officials testified that normally prisoners would be allowed to
marry only in the cases of a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child. Id.
12. Id. at 2257. The certified class included those who were or may be confined at Renz
and were interested in writing to inmates at other Missouri jails, as well as those "'who de-
sire[d] to... marry inmates of Missouri correctional institutions and whose rights of...
marriage have been or will be violated by employees of the Missouri Divisions of Correc-
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ulations violated their first and fourteenth amendment constitutional
rights.' 3 A federal district court, applying a strict scrutiny standard, 4
held that both regulations, as applied at Renz, were unconstitutional.' 5
The district court found that the regulations were "far more restrictive
than [was] either reasonable or essential for the protection of any state
security interest, or any other legitimate interest, such as rehabilitation of
inmates."' 6 Thus, although the state may have had a legitimate purpose
for enacting the regulations, it failed to use the least restrictive means to
accomplish that purpose.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding.' 7 The court of appeals agreed with the lower
court that the strict scrutiny standard rather than the reasonableness
standard 8 applied when evaluating the constitutionality of the prison
regulations."' The appellate court viewed both'prison regulations as be-
ing far more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the state's goals of
rehabilitation and security.2'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 ' The Court
held that the proper standard to evaluate prisoners' constitutional rights
was not the strict scrutiny standard, but rather, the reasonableness test.
22
tions.'" Id. at 2258 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 21-22, Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307
(8th Cir. 1985) (Nos. 84-1827, 84-2337)).
13. Id. at 2258. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of the people to peacably
asemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. Saftey v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir.
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Under the strict scrutiny test, in
addition to showing that the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it must also be shown that the limitation is no greater than necessary to protect the
governmental interest involved. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
15. Safley, 586 F. Supp. at 594-96.
16. Id. at 594.
17. Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd in pani and rev'd in part, 107 S.
Ct. 2254 (1987).
18. The Supreme Court has defined the reasonableness test as follows: "[W]hether the
prohibition [in question] . . . is reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives."
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1983).
19. Safley, 777 F.2d at 1314.
20. Id. at 1315.
21. 476 U.S. 1139 (1986).
22. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261.
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The Court listed four factors that should be balanced when determining
the reasonableness of a prison regulation.23 Applying the reasonableness
test to the prison regulations at Renz, the Court concluded that the mar-
riage regulation was unreasonable because it failed to promote "legiti-
mate penological interests."'24 The Court, however, found the mail
regulation to be a reasonable attempt by prison officials to increase the
effectiveness of prison security and the rehabilitation process.25
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. The development of a standard
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, began her analysis by
recognizing that prisoners are entitled to the protection of the Constitu-
tion and the rights it bestows.26 The Court stated that when a prison
regulation infringes on a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal
courts must use their authority to protect that right.2 7 The majority fur-
ther noted, however, that courts are generally not equipped to evaluate
many aspects of prison administration and reform, and thus should give
extreme deference to prison authorities.28 The Court stated that its task
in Turner29 was "to formulate a standard of review for prisoners' consti-
tutional claims that is responsive both to the 'policy of judicial restraint
regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional
rights.' "30 This sentiment led the majority to develop the Turner reason-
23. Id. at 2262. In determining reasonableness the Court listed four relevant factors.
First, whether there is a "'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it." Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). Second, "whether there are alternative means of exercising the
right that remain open to prison inmates." Id. Third, the impact accommodation of the as-
serted right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally. Id. Finally, whether there are ready alternatives that fully accomodate the pris-
oner's rights at a minimal cost to valid penological interests. Id.
24. Id. at 2267.
25. Id. at 2264. The Supreme Court, however, found that the appellate court did not rule
on the district court's finding "that the correspondence regulation had been applied by prison
officials in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at 2267. This issue was remanded to the
court of appeals for consideration. Id.
26. Id. at 2259 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (recognized prisoners'
right to due process); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (right to petition government for
solution to grievances); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prisoners protected from
racial discrimination by the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause)).
27. Id. at 2259 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)).
28. Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
29. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).





The Turner Court first looked to Procunier v. Martinez"1 in an at-
tempt to find a standard to apply to prisoners' constitutional claims.32
The regulation in Martinez prohibited prisoners from sending mail to
non-prisoners in which the prisoners excessively complained, magnified
their complaints or expressed negative views toward religion, politics or
race.33 The Martinez Court applied a strict scrutiny standard, and invali-
dated the regulation because of its impact on non-prisoners' first and
fourteenth amendment rights.34 The Martinez Court, however, expressly
reserved the question of which was the proper standard to apply to cases
dealing exclusively with "prisoners' rights."35 Thus, the Turner majority
ruled that the Martinez decision did not mandate applying the strict scru-
tiny standard in prisoners' rights cases.36
To determine the correct standard, the Turner Court next looked to
four post-Martinez cases in which the Court had applied a reasonableness
test in assessing the constitutionality of various prison regulations.37 In
the first case, Pell v. Procunier,3 s prisoners alleged that a regulation
prohibiting in-person media interviews with individual inmates violated
their first amendment rights. 39 Based on a reasonableness test, the Pell
31. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
32. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2259.
33. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 399.
34. Id. at 413-14. The Martinez Court stated:
The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by
letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a "liberty" interest within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the
circumstance of imprisonment. As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental
invasion.
Id. at 418.
35. Id. at 409.
36. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260.
37. Id. at 2260-62. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The reasonableness test, as formulated prior to Turner, first
required that a prisoner prove that a regulation infringed upon his or her constitutional right.
Hutchison, Analyzing the Religious Free Exercise Rights of Inmates. The Significance of Pell,
Jones, and Wolfish, 11 N.Y.U. REV. oF LAW AND Soc. CHANGE 413, 414 (1982). The state
then had the burden of proving that the regulation was necessary to maintain "institutional
security and order or rehabilitation." Id. Once the state had accomplished this, for the regula-
tion to be found unconstitutional, the prisoner needed to show "that the regulation [was] irra-
tional, or an 'exaggerated response' to the interest asserted by the state. .. ." Id.
38. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
39. Id. at 820-21. Rather than focusing on the purpose of prohibiting in-person media
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Court held that prisoners' first amendment rights were not violated,'
and that a violation would be found only when it is shown that the prison
officials' response to the security concern was exaggerated. 41 If the re-
sponse is not found to be exaggerated, courts should ordinarily defer to
the expert judgment of the prison administrators.42
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,43 the second post-Mar-
tinez case, the Court considered prisoners' constitutional rights.' In
Jones, prison rules prohibited inmates from having labor union meetings,
attempting to induce other inmates to join the union, and receiving bulk
mailings from union-related outside sources.45 'The Supreme Court
found that the regulation regarding bulk mailings was reasonable under
the circumstances and that the ban on union meetings and group solicita-
tion was rationally related to the reasonable goal of prison administra-
tion.46 Therefore, the Court held the prison regulations did not violate
the prisoners' constitutional rights.47
The third post-Martinez case, Bell v. Wolfish,4 8 involved a prison
interviews, the Pell Court centered on available alternative means of communication. Id. at
824-25.
40. Id. at 835. The Court stated that "'[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considera-
tions underlying our penal system.'" Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948)); cf Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (prison inmates retain those first amend-
ment rights which are not inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the prison).
41. Pell, 417 U.S. at 827. The Court noted that in various contexts it has held that reason-
able communication-related time, place or manner restrictions "'may be neccessary to further
significant governmental interests .... '" Id. at 826 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (anti-picketing and anti-noise ordinance). Additionally, the Pell Court
cited Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966) (statute prohibiting trespass upon premises
of county jail); Cox v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (law prohibiting peace distur-
bance, obstructing public passages, and courthouse picketing); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 398 (1953) (city ordinance forbidding holding of religious meeting in public park
without license); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (authority of a munici-
pality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the
use of the public highways)). Id.
42. Id. at 827.
43. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
44. Id. at 121.
45. Id. at 122. The Jones Court failed to explain how bulk mailings, union meetings, and
group solicitation threatened prison security. The Court merely speculated that trouble might
occur. Id. at 132-33. The Court stated: "[P]rison officials concluded that the presence, per-
haps even the objectives, of a prisoners' labor union would be detrimental to order and security
in the prisons .... It is enough to say that they have not been conclusively shown to be wrong
in this view." Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 129.
47. Id. at 133.
48. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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regulation prohibiting prisoners from receiving hardback books unless
the books were mailed directly from publishers, bookstores or book-
clubs.4 9 The Bell Court stated that in the absence of regulations far more
restrictive than these, the judgment of the prison administrators would
receive great deference.50 The Court found no evidence that the prison
officials had exaggerated their response to the security problem, and thus
held the regulation constitutionally valid. 1
In Block v. Rutherford,52 the last post-Martinez case cited by the
Turner Court, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on contact visits.53 The
Court determined that the visits were detrimental to prison security and
that the ordinance was reasonably related to security concerns.
5 4
In Turner, the Eighth Circuit had distinguished these four cases by
noting that unlike Martinez, the four cases involved mere time, place or
manner restrictions on speech or activities that were inherently danger-
ous.55 The appellate court contended that the regulations in Turner, by
contrast, involved content-based restrictions on speech, an activity which
in itself was harmless. Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned, the Mar-
tinez strict scrutiny standard should be applied to the Turner
regulations. 6
49. Id. at 548-49.
50. Id. at 551. The Turner Court observed that the rule was a rational response to what
was a clear security problem. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260. The Court in Bell elaborated on the
need for the ordinance. The Court stated:
It hardly needs to be emphasized that hardback books are especially serviceable for
smuggling contraband into an institution; money, drugs, and weapons easily may be
secreted in the bindings .... They also are difficult to search effectively. There is
simply no evidence in the record to indicate that ... officials have exaggerated their
response to this security problem and to the administrative difficulties posed by the
necessity of carefully inspecting each book mailed from unidentified sources.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 550-51 (1978) (citations omitted).
51. Id.
52. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
53. Id. at 591-92. A contact visit is one in which the prisoner and the visitor can meet
without a barrier to physical contact. Id. at 578.
54. Id. at 591. The Court held that:
Contact visits invite a host of security problems. They open the institution to the
introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Visitors can easily conceal
guns, knives, drugs, or other contraband in countless ways and pass them to an in-
mate unnoticed by even the most vigilant observers. And these items can readily be
slipped from the clothing of an innocent child, or transferred by other visitors per-
mitted close contact with inmates.
Id. at 586. For a discussion of Bell and Block, see Jacobs, Prisoners' Rights, ANN. SuRv. OF
AM. LAW 325, 325-35 (1985).
55. Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1310-13 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
56. Id.
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The Supreme Court disagreed. 7 Justice O'Connor noted that the
Supreme Court did not apply a strict scrutiny standard in any of the four
post-Martinez cases."8 Instead, in those cases the Court applied a reason-
ableness test asking whether the regulation was reasonably related to le-
gitimate penological objectives, and whether the regulation was an
exaggerated response to the problem. 9
In its analysis of the four post-Martinez cases, the Turner Court as-
serted that in Pell, the factor that mandated application of the reasona-
bleness test was not the applicability of the time, place, or manner
distinction, but rather that there were alternative means for an inmate to
exercise the right in question.60 Thus, under Pell, the extent to which
one is deprived of a right will be scrutinized when balancing a prisoner's
first amendment right with the government's interest in security.
61
The Turner majority also disagreed with the court of appeals' sug-
gestion that the reasonableness test should be applied only where the
prison enacts a time, place, or manner restriction or where the regulation
prohibits dangerous activities.62 Justice O'Connor asserted that the court
of appeals had failed to establish a standard by which courts could evalu-
ate whether an activity was inherently dangerous.63 Instead, Justice
O'Connor claimed that the court of appeals simply stated that a letter
does not present the same kind of security problem as a hardback book."4
The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence to support this con-
clusion, and stated that categorizing an activity as presumptively danger-
ous is really a conclusion "about the reasonableness of the prison
restriction in light of the articulated security concern."6
The majority contended that even if the reasoning of Pell, Jones, and
Bell did not resolve the standard of review question left open in Martinez,
the Turner Court would resolve it.66 In announcing the new standard,
the Court stated: "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' con-
stitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legit-
57. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261.
58. Id. at 2260.
59. Id. at 2260-61.
60. Id. at 2261 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-24 (1974)).
61. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824 (1974)).
62. Id. (citing Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1310-12 (8th Cir. 1985)).
63. Id. (citing Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1985)).
64. Id. (citing Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d at 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 1985)). In Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court found that allowing prisoners to have hardback books in the
prison caused a security risk. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551. See supra text accompanying note 50.




imate penological interests." 67 The Court explained that applying a
strict scrutiny standard would harm prison administrators' ability to deal
effectively with security problems by requiring them to predict which
remedy is the least restrictive.68 Furthermore, it would place the respon-
sibility on non-expert judges to decide whether the best possible solution
was being used.69
The majority then extracted four factors from the Supreme Court's
post-Martinez prison cases that must be balanced in deciding the validity
of a prison regulation:70 "First, there must be a 'valid, rational connec-
tion' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental in-
terest put forward to justify it;"'' T  second, there must be "alternative
means of exercising the right[s] that remain open to the prison in-
mates;"7 2 third, a court must consider "the impact accommodation of
the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally;" ' 73 lastly, the absence
of a ready alternative that fully accomodates a prisoner's rights at "de
minimis" costs to valid penological interests is also evidence that the reg-
ulation is reasonable. 74 The Court emphasized that the last factor is not
the least restrictive alternative test. Under this factor, the inmate must
not only show that an alternative exists but that the inmate's alternative
accommodates prisoners' rights at a de minimis cost to valid prison
interests.76
67. Id.
68. Id. at 261-62 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Labor Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119,
128 (1977)). The Supreme Court has also deferred to authority in cases involving military
regulations. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
69. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261-62. The Court reasoned that by making the judges the final
arbiters, federal courts would become increasingly involved in prison administration affairs.
Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407 (1974)).
70. Id. at 2262. The Court claimed that by analyzing Pell, Jones, and Bell, a test could be
developed to determine whether a prison regulation violated a prisoners' constitutional rights.
Id.
71. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). The regulation will be
found invalid if the logical connection between the regulation and the goal is so remote that it
makes the policy irrational or arbitrary. Id. The government's purpose must be legitimate and
neutral and the regulation that impinges on prisoners' first amendment rights must operate in a
neutral way, without regard to the content of expression. Id; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 551;
Pell, 417 U.S. at 828.
72. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
73. Id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132-33
(1974)).
74. Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)).
75. Id. The least restrictive alternative test would require the prison to show that there is
no alternative regulation that would substantially accomplish the prison goals, while at the
same time being less restrictive of the prisoners' rights. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
76. Id.
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a. The application of the Turner test to the mail regulation
The Turner Court concluded that under its newly-minted reasona-
bleness test, the mail regulation prohibiting inmates from writing to pris-
oners at other institutions, did not violate the prisoners' first amendment
rights.7 7 Under the first prong of the Turner test-whether there is a
valid relationship between the regulation and a legitimate governmental
interest-the majority found that the ordinance was enacted for security
reasons.78 Based on the testimony of prison officials indicating that mail
can be used to communicate escape plans, arrange assaults, and plan
other dangerous activities, the Court reasoned that the correspondence
prohibition was logically related to these security concerns.79 Moreover,
the Court noted that this kind of communication is sometimes forbidden
even after a prisoner has been released on parole.80
As to the second prong of the reasonableness test-whether there
are alternative means of exercising the asserted right-the Court noted
that the regulation at Renz did not deprive the prisoners of all forms of
expression.1 Rather, "it bar[red] communication only with a limited
class of other people with whom prison officials have particular cause to
be concerned-inmates at other institutions within the Missouri prison
system.
' 82
Next, Justice O'Connor noted that testimony by prison officials indi-
cated that correspondence between prisoners in different facilities
threatened the prison administrators' ability to maintain safety and inter-
nal security. 3 Moreover, the Court asserted that the right to correspond
in Turner was analogous to the purported right of prisoners to organize
into a labor union in Jones, in that if these "rights" were recognized, less
liberty and safety could result for both prisoners and guards alike.84 The
77. Id. at 2264.
78. Id. at 2263.
79. Id. (citing 2 Record at 76, 4 Record at 225-28). Witnesses testified before the district
court that there was an increasing problem with prison gangs, and that restricting correspon-
dence between gang members in different prisons was an important variable in solving the
problem. Id. (citing 2 Record at 75-77, 3 Record at 266-67, 4 Record at 226). Officials also
testified that Renz was used to provide protective custody for certain inmates and that this
could be jeopardized by permitting correspondence between Renz and other facilities. Id. (cit-
ing 3 Record at 264-65).
80. Id; see, eg., 28 C.F.R. § 2.40(a) (10) (1987), which makes federal parole conditional
on not associating with known criminals unless the parolee has express permission from his or
her parole officer.
81. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)). For
a discussion of the Jones decision see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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Court reasoned that there was an even greater potential "ripple effect""5
in Turner than there was in Jones.86 In Jones, the problems associated
with allowing prisoners to engage in unregulated union activity had been
isolated within a single prison.87 In Turner, however, prisoners' corre-
spondence with inmates at other facilities manifestly affected the staff
and the inmates of more than one institution.88 Where safety and secur-
ity are at stake, the Court reasoned, "the choice made by correction offi-
cials-which is, after all, a judgment 'peculiarly within [their] province
and professional expertise,' should not be lightly set aside by the
courts."89 The benefit to both prisoners and staff from the mail restric-
tion thus outweighed the infringement on prisoners' right to
correspond. 90
Lastly, the Court asserted that there were no obvious or easy alter-
natives to the regulation chosen.91 The only alternative suggested by the
prisoners-monitoring prison correspondence-would create more than
a de minimis cost.92 Not only would there be a risk of missing dangerous
correspondence, but there would be a heavy burden on staff resources as
well.
93
On the basis of this analysis, the Turner Court concluded that "[t]he
prohibition on correspondence [at Renz was] reasonably related to valid
corrections goals." 94  Thus, the mail regulation was held to be
constitutional.
b. prohibition on marriage
The Turner Court next considered the regulation prohibiting in-
mates from marrying without the permission of the prison superinten-
85. A ripple effect occurs where the assertion of a right impacts negatively on prisoners or
prison staff. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
86. Id. at 2263.
87. Jones, 433 U.S. at 122.
88. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263.
89. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
90. Id. The Court noted that other prison systems, such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
had concluded that similar restrictions on prison correspondence were necessary to ensure
security and order. Id; see, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 540.17 (1987).
91. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
92. Id. at 2264. Prison officials testified that it would not be possible to read every piece of
mail, and thus, there would be a great risk of missing dangerous messages. Id. (citing 3 Rec-
ord at 159, 4 Record at 42-43). Even if some messages were found, others could be written in
code, and thus overlooked by the prison staff. Id. For these reasons, the Court concluded that
this was not an adequate alternative to the present practice. Id.
93. Id. The Court, however, remanded to the district court the prisoners' challenge that
the regulation had been applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. at 2267.
94. Id. at 2264.
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dent.9 5 Prison officials argued that the right to marry is not a
fundamental right in the context of a prison,96 and that even if prisoners
have a constitutional right to marry, any regulation affecting the right
should be evaluated under a reasonableness standard rather than under
strict scrutiny.9 7 In this light, prison officials concluded that because
"the restriction [was] reasonably related to legitimate security and reha-
bilitation concerns,""8 it did not violate the prisoners' constitutional
rights.
The Court recognized that the fundamental right to marry applies
to prisoners as well as free persons. 99 The Court stated: "It is settled
that a prison inmate 'retains those [constitutional] rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penologi-
cal objectives of the corrections system.' "o According to the Court,
there are many valid reasons for allowing prisoners to marry.101 First,
inmate marriages, like marriages in general, are a sign of commitment
and the desire for emotional support.102 Second, many religions require
marriage as a showing of personal dedication and religious faith. 103
Third, most prisoners look forward to their release and form the mar-
riage with the belief that they will someday live together as man and
wife."° Lastly, many government benefits are conditioned on marital
status.105 The majority held that the combination of these factors cre-
ated a constitutional right for prisoners to marry.1 0 6
95. Id. at 2265; see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
96. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2265. Prison officials conceded that under Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1976), the right to marry was found to be a fundamental right. They claimed,
however, that Zablocki does not apply to a prison setting. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2265.
97. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2265.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1976); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967)).
100. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). The Court noted, however,
that the right to marry in a prison context may be restricted. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The Court noted that expressions of emotional support and public commitment
are important and valuable aspects of marriage. Id.
103. Id. Common sense demonstrates that it is important for a prisoner working toward
rehabilitation to feel good about himself and the progress that he is making. One who is
religious, and is refused the right to marry, is prevented from fully exercising his or her reli-
gious beliefs. This can have a devastating effect on the rehabilitation process.
104. Id.
105. Id. The Court listed benefits such as social security, property rights and the right to
have a child born out of wedlock deemed legitimate. Id.
106. Id. The Court reasoned that this conclusion is not contrary to Butler v. Wilson, 415
U.S. 953 (1974), which summarily affirmed Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377, 380-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 415 U.S. 953 (1974). In Johnson, a marriage prohibition applied only
to prisoners with life sentences; denial of the right to marry was an aspect of the punishment
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After establishing that prisoners have a constitutional right to
marry, the majority analyzed the Renz marriage regulation. 7 The mar-
riage regulation permitted a prisoner to marry "only with the permission
of the superintendent of the prison, and provide[d] that such approval
should be given only 'when there are compelling reasons to do so.' "108
The Court noted that the regulation not only governed marriages be-
tween inmates, but between prisoners and civilians as well.10 9 Because
civilians were actually affected by the regulation, the Court observed that
applying the Martinez strict scrutiny standard might be appropriate, be-
cause "the regulation may [have] entail[ed] a 'consequential restriction
on the [constitutional] rights of those who are not prisoners.' "110 The
Court concluded, however, that it need not consider the possible applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny standard, because even under the less demand-
ing reasonableness test, the regulation violated the prisoners'
constitutional rights."'
Prison authorities claimed that two governmental concerns justified
the finding that the marriage restriction was "reasonably related" to the
asserted security goal." 2 First, as a matter of security, officials claimed
that love triangles, which may result from inmate marriages, could pro-
voke violent confrontations between the prisoners." 3 Second, with re-
gard to rehabilitation, Prison Superintendent William Turner testified
that many female prisoners were either too dependent on the men in their
lives, or were often abused at home, and that these factors were related to
their crimes. I 4 As a result, Turner testified that many women inmates
needed to become more self-reliant" and that the marriage prohibition
promoted this rehabilitative process.
16
Applying its reasonableness standard, the majority held that the
marriage regulation was unconstitutional." 7 The Court concluded that
for their crime. Id. at 381-82. The Turner Court distinguished Johnson on this basis. Turner,
107 S. Ct. at 2265.
107. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2265.
108. Id. at 2258 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 47, Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th
Cir. 1985) (Nos. 84-1827, 84-2237)).
109. Id. at 2265-66; see Petitioner's Brief at 40, Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987)
(No. 85-1384).
110. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
111. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266. The Court reasoned that if the regulation failed under the
more lenient reasonableness test, it became irrelevant whether strict scrutiny applied. Id.
112. Id.
113. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266.
114. Id. (citing 3 Record at 154-55).
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under the first factor of the reasonableness test, the prohibition on mar-
riage was not "reasonably related" to the asserted security and rehabilita-
tion goals."1 ' The Court reasoned that the "rule sweeps much more
broadly" than necessary for legitimate penological objectives." 9 Mis-
souri prison officials had claimed that they did not object to male inmate-
civilian marriages 2° and the district court had found that before the rule
was implemented, such marriages were not prohibited. 21 Thus, the ar-
gument that prison officials implemented the inmate marriage rule to aid
in prisoner rehabilitation appeared to the Court to be unnecessarily over-
broad and a meaningless justification.
1 22
The Court noted that the prison's justification for prohibiting in-
mate-civilian marriages was equally puzzling.12 3 Missouri prison officials
admitted that they usually had permitted inmate-civilian marriages.
1 24
The majority observed that the rehabilitation concern appeared to be
aimed primarily at female inmates marrying other inmates, not female
inmate-male civilian marriages.1 25 The Court further stated that the re-
habilitation concern itself was suspect.1 26 Justice O'Connor pointed to
the district court's finding that between 1979 and 1983 prison officials
had closely scrutinized all proposed female inmate-male civilian mar-
riages and had approved only one.127 In contrast, male inmate-female
civilian marriages were routinely approved. 128 These factors supported
the idea that the governmental interest was overbroad, and thus not legit-
imate under the first prong of the Court's newly formed reasonableness
test.
The majority further reasoned that under factor number two of the
reasonableness test, "[t]here [were] obvious, easy alternatives to the Mis-
souri regulation that accommodate the right to marry while imposing a
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2267 (citing 4 Record at 240-41).
121. Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 592 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th
Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
122. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266-67 (citing 2 Record at 141-42). If Superintendent Turner
believed that marriage would hinder the rehabilitative progress of male prisoners, he would not
have routinely approved them. Id. at 2266. Application of the rule to male prisoners therefore
appears to be unjusifiable. Id. at 2267.
123. Id. at 2266-67.
124. Id. at 2267 (citing 4 Record at 240-41). Specifically, Superintendent Turner stated
that he generally did not object to inmate-civilian marriages. Id. (citing 2 Record at 141-42).
125. Id. Implicitly, even if the rule applying to female inmate marriages was justified, it was






[minimal] burden on the pursuit of security objectives." 129 As an exam-
ple, Justice O'Connor explained that marriages are usually allowed in
federal prisons, but that the right to marry is denied if the warden deter-
mined that the marriage would be a threat to prison security. 30 The
majority noted that nowhere in the record was there testimony by prison
officials that such an alternative would not be an adequate way to ensure
security.'13  Furthermore, there was no evidence indicating that the mar-
riage regulation would prevent love triangles, as inmates tend to consort
with members of the opposite sex regardless of whether marriage would
eventually occur.
132
As to whether the exertion of the right to marry would have a nega-
tive impact on prisoners and prison staf, the Court determined that Tur-
ner was not a case where there would be a "ripple effect" on the prison
staff and the prisoners they supervise.1 13 The Court observed that
"where the inmate wishes to marry a civilian, the decision to marry is a
completely private one."'
134
Finally, the fourth Turner factor under which a court should deter-
mine whether there are alternatives to the regulation in question, led the
Court to conclude that the Missouri regulation was an exaggerated re-
sponse to the prison's security problem. 35 The Court found that there
were obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation that accomodated both
the right to marry and placed a de minimis burden on the pursuit of
legitimate security objectives. 136 As an example, the Court noted that
federal prisoners were generally permitted to marry unless the warden
determined that the marriage would be a threat to security. 3 '
The majority thus concluded that "the Missouri marriage regula-
tion, as written, [was] not reasonably related to these legitimate penologi-
cal interests."'
' 38
B. Justice Stevens' Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's holding that
129. Id. at 2266.
130. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986)).
131. Id.
132. Id. To say that a regulation prohibiting marriage will eliminate the development of
inmate rivalries is nonsensical. Rivalries develop during the courting process, which occurs
regardless of whether a prisoner may consumate his or her feelings through marriage.
133. Id; see supra text accompanying note 85.
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the marriage regulation violated the prisoners' constitutional rights, he
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the prison mail regulation was
a valid exercise of authority.139
Justice Stevens suggested that upholding a regulation merely be-
cause there is a logical connection between the regulation and a legiti-
mate institutional concern is meaningless.14 Stevens reasoned that such
a standard would allow wardens to curtail prisoners' rights any time they
were able to think of a plausible security concern to justify their ac-
tions. 41 Justice Stevens implied that the majority's standard was too
broad, because a warden can manufacture a relationship between prison
security and the prohibition of many constitutional rights. 142
1. Mail regulation
In his analysis of the majority opinion, Justice Stevens observed that
the prisoners were not attacking the validity of the mail regulation in
general, but rather, were attacking its application at Renz.143 The regu-
lation, as written, allowed correspondence between unrelated prisoners if
a specially formed classification/treatment team, comprised of prison
staff, felt that it was best for all parties involved.'" The district court,
however, found that Renz officials completely banned correspondence. 145
The rule was enforced without regard to whether security or rehabilita-
tion would be adversely affected by allowing a specific letter to be
mailed. 146 Moreover, the district court found that inmates were denied
139. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 2267 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 2267-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. (Stevens, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Illustrating how a mere
logical connection between the regulation and an institutional interest can lead to an unneces-
sary prohibition, Justice Stevens stated:
Indeed, there is a logical connection between prison discipline and the use of bull-
whips on prisoners; and security is logically furthered by a total ban on inmate com-
munication, not only with other inmates but also with outsiders who conceivably
might be interested in arranging an attack within the prison or an escape from it.
Id at 2268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This distinction is very
important. If the Court had focused on the broader issue of the regulation in general, and the
regulation was found to be reasonable and constitutionally valid, it does not mean that a nar-
rower, more restrictive application will also be valid.
144. Id. at 2269 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra notes 7-9
and accompanying text.
145. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Safley v. Turner, 586
F. Supp. 589, 591-92 (W.D. Mo. 1984)). The district court had found that Renz inmates could
not write to non-family inmates or receive mail from them. Id. This rule was set forth in the
"Renz Inmate Orientation Booklet" which inmates were given when they arrived at Renz. Id
146. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the right to correspond even when evidence indicated that their intent
was merely to pursue innocent friendships.14 7 In afrming the district
court decision, the court of appeals had held that:
absent a showing that prison officials would be unable to antici-
pate and avoid any security problems associated with inmate-
to-inmate mail that would result from application of the corre-
spondence rule as it is written and as enforced at other Mis-
souri prisons, the total ban at Renz found by the District Court
offends the First Amendment.
148
Justice Stevens agreed with the court of appeals that the correspondence
regulation as applied at Renz was unconstitutional.
49
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's finding, that
the prisoners still had alternative means of expressing their right because
all communication with the outside world was not cut off, was not rele-
vant in determining whether the rule as applied at Renz was unnecessa-
rily broad. 5 ° The issue was whether all inmate-inmate correspondence
should have been banned, and not whether there were other unrelated
ways a prisoner could communicate. Justice Stevens further concluded
that a fair application of this reasoning would mandate the absurd result
of upholding the marriage regulation because it too could have been
more restrictive.' 5 '
Justice Stevens noted that the Court's last reason for upholding the
mail regulation was that it would be impossible for prison staff to ex-
amine the contents of all inmate mail. 5 z Justice Stevens asserted that
this finding was not supported by the record in the district court. 153 The
147. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Safley v. Turner, 586
F. Supp. 589, 591-92 (W.D. Mo. 1984)). These factual findings led the district court to issue
an injunction holding that the prohibition was "unnecessarily sweeping." Id. (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 596 (W.D.
Mo. 1984)). The district court also held that "'[dlefendants have failed to demonstrate that
the needs of Renz are sufficiently different to justify greater censorship than is applied by other
well-run institutions."' Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 587, 596 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
148. Id. at 2270 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Safley v.
Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1315-16 (8th Cir. 1985)).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens referred to
the idea that both regulations, despite their restrictive nature, do not completely eliminate all
aspects of the privilege. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Under this
reasoning, the Court should reach the same result in both situations. Id. (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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trial record contained no statistics regarding how many letters were sent
to or were received from Renz. 15 4 The state itself could only say that it
had 8,000 inmates throughout the state and that it assumed that inmates
would write.15 Justice Stevens concluded that the rule enforced at Renz
was an " 'excessive response' "based on speculation and deference rather
than on consideration of expert opinion.
15 6
2. Prohibition on marriage
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's approval of the corre-
spondence regulation was puzzling when compared to its disapproval of
the marriage regulation.15 7 Stevens noted that the majority concluded
that it was mere speculation to assume that the security problems associ-
ated with love triangles stemmed from inmate-to-inmate marriage.
15 8
However, the majority gave deference to the prison administrator's spec-
ulation that inmate mail posed a threat of gang violence and transmission
of secret codes. 159 It was also puzzling how the majority correctly dis-
credited the speculation that, after release from prison, an inmate spouse
might try to help the other inmate escape, while the majority gave weight
to the testimony that escape plans might be hidden in letters.'
60
Justice Stevens observed further contradictions in the majority's bal-
ancing of the evidence. 16 1 Although the majority had struck down the
marriage regulation finding it to be more restrictive than practices at
other Missouri prisons, it upheld the mail regulation, despite the fact that
154. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Transcript of Oral Arg. at
14). The State called two witnesses to support its contention that reviewing inmate mail would
be an impracticable task. Id. at 2272-73 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Mr. Blackwell had stated that, not only would it be impossible to read all the mail, but
that he would not want to. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing 4 Record at 41-43). Ms. Halford, a witness from Kansas, had claimed that due to the
amount of mail received, reading it would not only be boring, but would also be a poor use of
time. Id. at 2273 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
believed that Halford's statement was applicable to the Kansas facility, but not to Renz, which
was considerably smaller in size. Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The average population at Renz in 1983 was only 270 persons. Id. n.12. As the district
court stated: "[t]he staff at Renz has been able to scan and control outgoing and incoming
mail, including inmate to inmate correspondence.'" Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 592 (W.D. Mo.
1984)).
156. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 2274 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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mail regulation was more restrictive than similar rules throughout the
state.162 The Court had acknowledged that marriage has many charac-
teristics that help to enhance rehabilitation;' 63 it discounted any benefits
gained from writing to a friend on the basis that all commumication with
the outside world had not been eliminated.' Furthermore, the majority
had rejected the district court's finding that the mail regulation was un-
fair due to " 'excessive paternalism' "but credited this same testimony in
the context of the marriage regulation.'
65
Justice Stevens noted that by pointing out these inconsistencies, he
was not indicating that the analysis of the marriage regulation was im-
proper.1 66 Rather, he concluded that if the majority consistently applied
its new standard, the mail regulation as well as the marriage regulation
would have been found to be unconstitutional. 167
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Choice of a Standard
In Turner v. Safley, 161 the United States Supreme Court was called
upon to further define how courts should evaluate a claim that a prison
regulation has violated a prisoner's constitutional rights. For inmates,
Turner was a chance to establish a higher degree of protection by reviv-
ing the application of the strict scrutiny test;169 for prison officials, the
case presented an opportunity to enhance their control by convincing the
Court to apply a far less demanding standard of reasonableness.'
70
Based on precedent, a strong argument could be made for applying
either of these standards of judicial review. 17' The Turner Court, how-
162. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Id. at 2275 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
169. In light of the most recent pre-Turner Supreme Court decisions, there was considera-
ble doubt as to the future application of the strict scrutiny standard to the context of chal-
lenged prison regulations. If the prisoners could convince the Court to apply the strict
scrutiny standard where a right had been completely deprived, then the greater protection
would appropriately have been afforded where it was most needed.
170. By applying the reasonableness test to this case, the Court would be applying it to the
only class of prisoner cases-cases where a right is being completely deprived-where its appli-
cability was in dispute.
171. None of the pre-Turner Supreme Court cases had explicitly established a standard
applicable to a case where a prisoner's right had been completely eliminated. Block v. Ruther-
ford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). It was
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ever, rejected the prisoners' contention that a reasonableness test should
be applied only where a regulation protects the prison from a dangerous
condition, or involves a mere time, place or manner restriction on inmate
speech.17 The majority noted that the Court in Pell v. Procunier,
173
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
174 and Bell v. Wolfish 175
had addressed the question of what standard should be used to evaluate
prisoners' constitutional claims.176 However, the Court asserted that
even if its prior decisions did not address the question, it had the power
to do so in this case. 177 In utilizing that power, the Court found the
reasonableness test to be the proper standard.
1 78
B. The Court's Application of its New Standard
1. Turner v. Safley: Lack of an evenhanded application
In Turner v. Safley,17 9 the United States Supreme Court identified
four factors that a court must balance in deciding whether a prison regu-
lation is reasonable and thus constitutional: (1) whether there is a valid
connection between the regulation and a legitimate governmental inter-
est; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to
the prisoner; (3) the impact that exertion of the right will have on prison-
ers and prison staff; and (4) whether the regulation is an "exaggerated
response" to an interest which could be accomplished by alternative
means at a de minimis cost.180
The Turner Court's application of its new reasonableness standard
clearly reveals the manipulability of the test. It is this manipulability
that will cause a lack of uniformity among the lower courts and will deter
prisoners from asserting their constitutional rights. This fact can best be
possible to argue either that: (1) since this is different from the cases where the reasonableness
test had been applied, the strict scrutiny test should be applied; or (2) this is just another case
where the reasonableness standard should be applied, and that by looking at past cases we can
determine the relevant factors for defining reasonableness.
172. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261.
173. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
174. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
175. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
176. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260-61.
177. Id. at 2261. The prior cases, while dealing with prisoners' constitutional rights, had
established no general rule. Block, 468 U.S. at 576; Bell, 441 U.S. at 520; Jones, 443 U.S. at
119; Pell, 417 U.S. at 817. The Court in Turner saw the establishment of such a general rule as
its task, and adopted a reasonableness test as appropriate in all prison cases where rights of
non-prisoners are not involved. Id. at 2262.
178. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
179. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
180. Id. at 2262.
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exemplified by comparing the Court's use of evidence in both the corre-
spondence and marriage regulations.
a. connection between the regulation and the governmental interest
Under the first prong of the Turner test, the majority found that the
marriage regulation was not logically related to legitimate security con-
cerns."8' The prison officials claimed that the regulation was enacted to
help control problems stemming from the formation of "love trian-
gles." ' The Turner Court correctly observed that these relationships
would exist regardless of a prisoner's marital status. 3
However, when considering the correspondence regulation, the ma-
jority arrived at a different conclusion. The majority concluded that the
correspondence regulation was logically related to a legitimate security
concern.' 4 The finding of a legitimate security concern was based on the
speculative testimony of three witnesses.1 8
The first witness, Superintendent Turner, speculated that the regula-
tion would stop communication at an early stage.'8 6 His testimony, how-
ever, failed to show that the correspondence would cause a security
risk.18 7 The second witness, Ms. Halford of Kansas, claimed that the
mail system could be used to plan escapes and that prohibiting inmate
correspondence would help halt the beginning of gang problems. 8 The
trial judge correctly attached little weight to Ms. Halford's testimony as
there were no gang problems in Kansas despite the allowance of inmate
correspondence. 8 9 The last witness, Mr. Blackwell, testified that one
way to attempt to prevent gangs is by limiting inmate correspondence.' 90
Mr. Blackwell's testimony, however, merely supported the proposition
181. Id. at 2266.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2265.
184. Id. at 2264.
185. Id. at 2270-73 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 2 Record
at 76).
186. Id. at 2270 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Stevens further concluded
that Turner's testimony supported the district court's holding that the mail regulation was an
exaggerated response to the fear of gang problems at Renz. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 2271 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at
160). Ms. Halford, "the Director of the Kansas Correctional Institution at Lansing," had
reviewed the prison's policies, visited Renz for a few hours, and "discussed the case with Su-
perintendent Turner." Id. at 2270-71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at 158).
190. Id. at 2271 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at
267). Mr. Blackwell was in charge of general management of "Missouri's adult correctional
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that some restrictions may be necessary, but did not lend support to the
total ban on inmate correspondence in effect at Renz.1 91 The Turner
Court viewed this speculative evidence, however, as sufficient, and con-
cluded that the correspondence regulation was logically related to a legit-
imate security concern. 192 This was so, even though the average
population at Renz was 270 persons, 193 and it took only one hour a day
to scan all incoming mail from other institutions, as well as some outgo-
ing mail.
194
b. alternative means of exercising the asserted right
In applying the second prong of the Turner reasonableness test to
the marriage regulation 95 -whether there remains open to prison in-
mates an alternative means of exercising the constitutional right-the
majority surprisingly did not focus on the fact that there were no alterna-
tive means of exercising the right to marry. The Turner marriage rule
exemplifies in its most pristine form the failure of a prison regulation to
meet this prong. By forbidding a prisoner from marrying, he or she is
left with no alternative but to completely refrain from the desired
activity.
This prong of the Turner test, however, presents a problem that
arises when the test is applied to a rule like the correspondence regula-
tion. Whether a court will find that there are alternative means of exer-
cising a given right will depend on the framing of the parameters of that
right. If the right in Turner was described narrowly as the right to com-
municate with prisoners at other institutions, then there would be no
alternative means of exercising it. The Turner Court, however, defined
the right more broadly as encompassing "all means of expression."' 196
The Court then concluded that only one small part of a prisoner's right
to communicate was barred: the right to communicate with "inmates at
other institutions within the Missouri prison system." '97 This prong of
the test offers no guidance as to how broadly or narrowly a right is to be
defined. If a court is in favor of the regulation, it can do what was done
in Turner: define the regulation in question as only barring one small
facilities and did not make daily decisions concerning the inmate correspondence permitted at
Renz." Id (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id. at 2264.
193. Id. at 2273 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 2266.
196. Id. at 2263.
197. Id.
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part of the total right."98 Thus, under the Turner test, when dealing with
any right that has more than one dimension, the right can always be
broken into components, and a prisoner can be denied any part of it.
c. impact on prisoners and staff
Under the third prong of the Turner reasonableness test-the extent
to which accommodating an asserted right will impact on prisoners and
staff-the majority concluded that accommodating the right to marry
will not have a detrimental effect on the prison staff. 199 As love triangles
will develop regardless of a marriage ceremony, the ceremony in and of
itself is not the critical factor in determining whether rivalries will
develop.2 °°
When evaluating the correspondence regulation, however, the Court
found that the third prong of the test was satisfied based on the testimony
of prison officials.20 1 Prison officials had asserted that "correspondence
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2266.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2263. Superintendent Turner had offered no proof that the correspondence pro-
hibition prevented escape plots. Id. at 2270 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Turner stated that "'[flrom the standpoint that we don't have escapes, we don't have
the problems that are experienced in other institutions."' Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting 2 Record at 75). His testimony also failed to show that the
correspondence would cause a security risk; rather he could only speculate that this would
stop communication at an early stage. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing 2 Record at 76).
Justice Stevens concluded that Turner's testimony supported the district court's holding
that the mail regulation was an exaggerated response to the fear of gang problems at Renz. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 2 Record at 117-18).
The possibility of inmates using the postal system to transmit secret codes was not men-
tioned by either of the prison's two other witnesses. Id. at 2271 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Instead, Ms. Halford, a witness from Kansas who had not previously
been familiar with the rules in effect at Renz, testified that she saw two problems with having
an open correspondence rule. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
3 Record at 158-59). First, she stated that in the preceding year a male and female inmate
escaped together and were free for over a week. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing 3 Record at 158-59). She claimed that "they must have used the mails
to plan their escape." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3
Record at 158-59). The trial judge, however, presumably gave this testimony very little weight
because there had been no evidence of mail communication whatsoever. Id. (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at 158-59). Second, Halford claimed
that a prohibition on inmate correspondence would help halt the initiation of gang problems.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at 160). The trial
judge attached little weight to this statement because there had been no gang problem in Kan-
sas' prison system despite the allowance of inmate-to-inmate correspondence. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at 158). Justice Stevens suggested
that it was ironic that the witness could not convince her employers in Kansas to enact a
prohibition on inmate correspondence, but yet her speculative testimony had managed to con-
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between prison institutions facilitates the development of informal orga-
nizations that threaten the core functions of prison administration, main-
taining safety and internal security.""2 2 Rather than require specific
evidence showing that problems would arise at Renz, the Court chose to
defer to the expertise of the prison officials.2"3 This exemplifies another
way in which the Turner standard is highly manipulable depending on
the degree of proof which a court deems necessary. If a court wants to
find a detrimental effect on prison security, it can accept proof based on
mere speculation. If it does not wish to uphold the regulation, a court
may be able to find that the connection between assertion of the right and
any actual harm is unsupported by the evidence and hence illusory.
d. alternatives to the regulation
Under the last prong of the Turner test,2" the majority found that
there were obvious alternatives to the marriage regulation.05 It con-
cluded to the contrary, however, when considering the correspondence
vince the Court. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at
168).
The second witness, Mr. Blackwell, testified that one way to attempt to prevent the forma-
tion of gangs is to limit inmate correspondence. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing 3 Record at 267). Mr. Blackwell managed Missouri adult correctional
facilities and did not make daily decisions regarding prison policy at Renz. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at 259-60). He was "'not sure'" if
he was aware of the rule at Renz that inmates cannot write to non-family inmates. Id. (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 4 Record at 44). He did not,
however, state that a complete ban was a necessary response. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). He did assert that some prisoners would correspond in an illegiti-
mate way. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 4 Record
at 82-83). Mr. Blackwell also stated that, in light of the type of offenders at Renz, "there is
more of a probability that they would be writing about things other than just sound positive
letter writing, given the nature of the offenders at Renz." Id. (quoting 4 Record at 82-83).
The witness further testified that he had read very little of the mail at Renz and that he was
just speculating as to what inmates might write about to each other. Id. (citing 4 Record at 82-
83).
Justice Stevens noted that Blackwell's testimony merely supported the idea that some
restrictions may be necessary but it did not support the total ban on inmate correspondence in
effect at Renz. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Consequently,
Justice Stevens agreed with the district court that prison officials "'failed to demonstrate that
the needs of Renz are sufficiently different to justify greater censorship than is applied by other
well-run institutions."' Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 596 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
202. Id. at 2263.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
205. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2266. For example, the majority recognized that in federal
prison, inmate marriages are permitted unless the warden finds that it would be harmful to
prison security or public safety. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986)).
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regulation.2 °6 The majority observed that monitoring inmate mail would
exact more than a de minimis cost to the prison.2" 7 The Court also
placed credence in the testimony of prison officials that it would be im-
possible to read every piece of inmate-to-inmate correspondence." 8 The
majority found this evidence compelling, even though a guard at Renz
testified that "at Renz he scanned the contents of all approved incoming
mail from other institutions, and that this task and scanning some outgo-
ing mail together took approximately one hour a day. '2 9 This testi-
mony is not consistent with the Court's finding that it would be
" 'impossible' to read the portion of the correspondence that is addressed
to, or received from, inmates in other institutions."21 0
In sum, each of the elements of the Turner test is so vague that the
test essentially permits a court to reach whatever result it wishes. The
standard will inevitably lead to inconsistencies in interpretation depend-
ing on the inclination of a particular court. Prisoners will suffer as they
will not be given any certain degree of protection. The lack of predict-
ability will not only leave prisoners unsure of their constitutional rights,
but will deter many from asserting them.
e. subsequent criticism of the Turner test
Justice Brennan has criticized the Turner standard as not being the
best way to guard prisoners' constitutional rights." Justice Brennan
stated that "[w]hile we must give due consideration to the needs of those
in power, this Court's role is to ensure that fundamental restraints on
206. Id. at 2263.
207. Id. at 2264. The State called two outside witnesses to support its contention that re-
viewing inmate mail would be an impracticable task. Id. at 2271 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Mr. Blackwell stated that not only would it be impossible to read
all the mail, but that he would not want to. Id. at 2272 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing 4 Record at 41-43). Ms. Halford claimed that, due to the amount of
mail received, not only would reading it be boring, but it would be poor use of time. Id. at
2273 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 3 Record at 176).
Justice Stevens believed that Halford's statement was applicable to the Kansas facility but not
to Renz, which was considerably smaller in size. Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The average population at Renz in 1983 was only 270 persons. Id. at
n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the district court stated:
"'[t]he staff at Renz has been able to scan and control outgoing and incoming mail, including
inmate-to-inmate correspondence." Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 592 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
208. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 4 Record at 42-43).
209. Id. at 2273 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 5 Record
at 97, 99).
210. Id. at 2273 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that power are enforced." '212
Justice Brennan's primary concern is that the Turner reasonableness
test is lax in its evaluation of prison officials' actions because it does not
differentiate between degrees of deprivation.213 The same test is applied
regardless of whether the prisoners' right to engage in a specified activity
is merely restricted or completely eliminated.2"4 It is true that the dis-
tinction between a restriction and an elimination of a right is one aspect
of the Turner reasonableness test, but rather than being the basis for a
heightened level of scrutiny, it merely becomes another factor to con-
sider.215 As Justice Brennan observed, if the Turner standard of review is
appropriate, the field of constitutional law could be reduced to one test
and we could incorporate all relevant variables under the test's rubric.
216
It is clear, however, that courts have not generally found this to be the
case; a stricter standard of review has been applied where the exertion of
a right has been prohibited or severely restricted.21 7
2. The Supreme Court further defines the Turner standard
Eight days after deciding Turner211 the Supreme Court had an op-
portunity to apply its new test in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 219 In
O'Lone, inmates alleged that two prison policies violated their first
amendment right to freedom of religion.220
The first policy, "Standard 853, ' '221 required inmates who were be-
ing shifted from maximum to minimum security status to spend a period
of time in "intermediate gang minimum status. ' 222 Prisoners in this in-
termediate group were assigned work away from the main prison build-
212. Id. at 2408 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under the Court's test a restriction limiting the use of
the prison library to certain times is given the same degree of scrutiny as a regulation prohibit-
ing inmates from reading entirely. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The message to prison offi-
cials is that they need only act reasonably and all such regulations will be upheld. Id.
(Brennan, ., dissenting).
214. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
215. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2408 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2408-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting); See also Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d
1015 (2d Cir. 1985) (strict scrutiny standard is applied where there is a complete deprivation of
a right).
218. 107 S. CL 2254 (1987).
219. 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
220. Id. at 2403. See supra note 13.
221. The term "Standard 853" merely refers to the specific policy mandating the implemen-
tation of intermediate gang minimum status. Id. at 2402.
222. Id. This intermediate status group was designed to combat problems that may arise
when a prisoner is transferred from maximum security status, which is restrictive, to minimum
security status, which has a much higher degree of freedom. Id.
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ings.223 The second policy prohibited these prisoners from returning to
the main buildings during the day.224 Moslem prisoners objected, claim-
ing the policies affected their ability to take part in Jumu'ah, a weekly
religious ceremony.225
The Court upheld the validity of both policies under the Turner rea-
sonableness test.226 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
held that under the first prong of the Turner test the policies were ration-
ally related to legitimate governmental interests in prison security.227
The Court reasoned that Standard 853 was designed to combat over-
crowding, and the second policy was necessary to combat congestion and
delays at the main gate, which was a high risk area.228
Under the second prong of the Turner test, in ascertaining whether
there were alternative means of exercising the asserted right, the O'Lone
Court stated that prisoners were not deprived of all forms of religious
expression since they could still engage in prayer and discussion during
non-working hours.229 The Court observed that in Turner, the right was
defined broadly as the right to communicate, rather than the right to
communicate with prisoners in other institutions.230 Similarly, the ma-
jority reasoned that here it was appropriate to broadly define the right as
the right to take part in "Muslim religious ceremonies," rather than in
one particular ceremony.
2 31
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's analysis
ignored the fact that "Jumu'ah is the central religious ceremony of Mus-
lims, 'comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith and the Sun-
day service of the various Christian sects.' ',232 Jumu'ah is not like other
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2403.
225. Id. Jumu'ah is a weekly religious service held in the main prison building or in an-
other building known as "the Farm." Id. at 2402. "Jumu'ah is commanded by the Koran and
must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its Zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon
prayer." Id; see Koran 62:9-10.
226. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2405.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2405-06.
229. Id. at 2406. Chief Justice Rehnquist further stated that Muslim prisoners were given
substitute meals whenever pork was served in the dining hall. Id. The prison made special
arrangements during the month long period of Rhamadan by giving the prisoners breakfast at
4:00 A.M. and dinner at 8:30 P.M. each evening. Id. The Chief Justice concluded that be-
cause prisoners were allowed to take part in these other activities, restricting their right to
Jumu'ah was reasonable. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2410 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928,
930 (D.N.J. 1984)).
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Moslem prayers that can be made up if missed, for the Koran commands
that Jumu'ah be attended.233 Justice Brennan observed that:
If a Catholic prisoner were prevented from attending Mass on
Sunday, few would regard that deprivation as anything but ab-
solute, even if the prisoner were afforded other opportunities to
pray, to discuss the Catholic faith with others, and even to
avoid eating meat on Friday if that were a preference. Prison
officials in this case therefore cannot show that "'other ave-
nues' remain available for the exercise of the asserted right.t
234
The majority, however, by defining the right broadly, again indicated
that if a right can be divided into several parts, only one of which is
foreclosed by the government, the Court will not hesitate to find that
alternative means of expressing the right exist.235
In O'Lone, the Court combined the last two prongs of the Turner
test.236 Under Turner prong number three, the O'Lone Court weighed
the four alternatives suggested by the prisoners and concluded that under
the fourth Turner factor, each of the alternatives would have had a nega-
tive impact on prison security "by allowing 'affinity groups'" to form. 237
The Court therefore rejected all four of the alternatives suggested by the
238prisoners.
233. Id. at 2410 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928,
930 (D.N.J. 1984)).
234. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977)).
235. Id. at 2406. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
236. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2406. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
237. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2406. Administrator O'Lone testified that whenever the prison
isolates particular groups, an organizational structure develops that threatens institutional au-
thority. Id.
238. Id. at 2412-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The prisoners provided four alternative sug-
gestions to the policies in effect. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The prisoners first suggested
that the prison assign gang minimum security prisoners to an inside work detail on Fridays.
Id. at 2412 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Prison officials testified that this would enable minimum
and maximum security prisoners to mingle. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). As noted by the
district court, this concern is nonsensical as "'[t]he defendants did not explain why inmates of
different security levels are not mixed on work assignments when otherwise they are mixed.'"
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D.N.J.
1984)). The O'Lone majority found, nonetheless, that this alternative directly conflicted with
standard 853's directive to place gang minimum security prisoners in outside work details. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). As noted by Justice Brennan:
This conclusion, however, neglects the fact that the very issue is whether the prison's
policy, of which Standard 853 is a part, should be administered so as to accommo-
date Muslim inmates. The policy itself cannot serve as a justification for its failure to
provide reasonable accommodation. The record as it now stands thus does not estab-
lish that the Friday alternative work detail would create a problem for the
institution.
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The O'Lone holding was consistent with the majority's opinion in
Turner. In both cases, the Court, by classifying the right broadly, found
that there had been an alternative way of expressing the right.239 The
O'Lone decision further demonstrated that the Court will not consider a
prisoner's alternative suggestions as viable if they will have any negative
affect on the prison, no matter how insignificant. From O'Lone, it seems
clear that the Court will uphold all prison regulations unless they have
absolutely no rational relation to a legitimate penological purpose.
3. Does the Turner test call for balancing?
When analyzing the Turner test, a question arises as to whether the
Turner factors were formulated to comprise a balancing test or whether
failure under one prong necessitates a finding of unreasonableness. In an
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Second, the prisoners suggested that gang minimum security inmates be permanently as-
signed to inside work details. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Prison officials, however, claimed
that they reserved inside work details for the riskiest gang minimum security inmates. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Prisoners claimed, in response, that there were a significant number
of inside jobs, in addition to those filled by the riskiest gang minimum security inmates, that
could be assigned to regular gang minimum security inmates. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan concluded that prison officials should have been required to provide data to
substantiate their claim. Id. at 2412-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Third, the prisoners suggested that gang minimum security inmates be assigned to week-
end work detail to allow them to make up the time missed in attending Jumu'ah on Friday.
Id. at 2413 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Prison officials, however, claimed that "'the creation of
additional weekend details would be a drain on scarce human resources.'" Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D.N.J. 1984). As noted by
Justice Brennan:
The record provides no indication, however, of the number of Muslims that would
seek such a work detail, the current number of weekend details, or why it would be
infeasible simply to reassign current Saturday or Sunday workers to Friday, rather
than create additional details. The prison is able to arrange work schedules so that
Jewish inmates may attend services on Saturday and Christian inmates may attend
services on Sunday.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The last alternative proposed by the prisoners was that minimum security inmates resid-
ing at the Farm be given work detail in the Farm building or in the immediate area. Id.
(Brennan, J., disssenting). Justice Brennan stated that "[s]ince Standard 853 permits such
assignments for full minimum inmates, and since such inmates need not return to prison facili-
ties through the main entrance, this would interfere neither with Standard 853 nor the concern
underlying the no-return policy." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The prison officials, however, claimed that this might create an affinity group comprised
of Muslims, which could threaten prison security. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan observed that prison authorities based this theory on pure speculation and that they pro-
duced no evidence exhibiting such a problem in the five years in which the prison allowed
Muslim inmates to attend Jumu'ah. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The O'Lone Court, how-
ever, deferred to the prison officials' judgment and found the proposed alternatives were not
constitutionally required. Id. at 2407.
239. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2406; Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263.
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effort to ascertain whether a prison regulation is constitutional, the Tur-
ner Court mandated the application of a four-part test.' 4 In Turner, the
majority concluded that the correspondence regulation was fully sup-
ported by each element of the test."4 The Court, however, did not indi-
cate whether a court must balance the factors when only some of the
factors point toward a finding of reasonableness. While this might be a
problem in theory, it is unlikely to be one in practice. This is because the
four Turner factors are either so closely related or so vague that a court
can virtually assume that there is no disagreement among them.
For example, if a court finds under the first prong that there is a
valid connection between a regulation and a legitimate governmental
purpose, then it will naturally conclude under prong three that the ex-
erted right would have an impact on prison staff. This makes perfect
sense. If there is a legitimate reason for enacting the regulation, it must
be to prevent some deleterious effect within the prison. And, once a
court finds that the regulation is rationally related to a penological pur-
pose and that it furthers prison security, the court will likely define the
prisoner's right broadly in order to find, under the second prong, that
there are other means available for exercising the right.242 Similarly,
under prong four, a court will be less inclined to find that the regulation
represents an exaggerated response, or that the state has alternative
means of dealing with the problem at hand.
In most situations where the court finds a regulation to be valid, its
decision will thus find support in all four Turner factors. The Turner
Court, however, did not explicitly bind itself to this assumption. To the
contrary, the Turner majority set forth four factors for determining the
reasonableness of the regulation. 43 This indicates that these factors were
deemed important by the Supreme Court but it does not indicate a court
is precluded from considering other factors. Further, since these factors,
in addition to other factors, may be used to prove that a regulation is
reasonable, it follows that the factors are to be balanced, and thus, do not
have to point toward the same conclusion. Yet, practically speaking,
240. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the balancing test in constitutional law, see generally Aleinkoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) and Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The
Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16 (1988).
241. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2256.
242. In Turner, the majority defined the correspondence right broadly by stating that "the
regulation does not deprive prisoners of all means of expression, but simply bars communica-
tion with a limited class of people--other inmates-with whom authorities have particular




courts will be unlikely to find that a prison regulation is unconstitutional
even when there are no alternatives that fully accommodate the expres-
sion of the right at a de minimis cost and where there are no other ways
of expressing the right. These consequences are too easily avoided by
merely defining the right broadly and finding that alternatives would be
too costly. Thus, most likely, as in Turner, the four factors of the reason-
ableness test will be either united in support of a regulation, or united
against it. The Turner Court has devised a standard that appears rigor-
ous on first reading, but in reality operates as little more than a vehicle by
which courts may implement their political beliefs.
4. The strict scrutiny standard after Turner
The current viability of the strict scrutiny standard in prisoners'
rights cases is a question of great doubt. The Turner Court asserted that
the Procunier v. Martinez2' strict scrutiny standard did not apply to
cases that solely involve prisoners' rights.2 4 The Turner Court held that
Martinez was distinguishable because Martinez involved the rights of
non-prisoners.246
Although at first glance the majority may appear to be affirming the
Martinez strict scrutiny standard for certain circumstances, upon closer
look this seems highly unlikely. The Turner test was based on the
Court's interpretation of four past Supreme Court cases.247 Significantly,
in all four cases the rights of non-prisoners were also involved. 24' These
cases249 seem to implicitly reject the Turner Court's holding that the
Martinez strict scrutiny will apply where a regulation also involves the
rights of non-prisoners.250
In light of Pell, Jones, Bell, and Block, the application of the Marti-
nez strict scrutiny standard remains questionable at best. These decisions
are distinguishable, however, on the basis that the regulations involved in
244. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
245. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2262. See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.
248. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 578 (1984) (ban on contact visits affected first
amendment rights of prisoners' visitors); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979) (ordinance
prohibiting receipt of hardback books affected first amendment rights of book publishers);
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 122 (1977) (regulation prohib-
iting bulk mailings from union-related outside source affected first amendment rights of pub-
lishers); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829 (1974) (regulation prohibiting in-person media
interviews affected first amendment rights of media).
249. Block, 468 U.S. at 578; Bell, 441 U.S. at 550; Jones, 433 U.S. at 122; Pell, 417 U.S. at
829.
250. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260.
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those cases did not infringe on the rights of non-prisoners in a manner
that was unduly burdensome. If courts drew this distinction, strict scru-
tiny will apply where the regulation causes an undue burden to the rights
of non-prisoners. On the other hand, the Supreme Court may have im-
plicitly overruled Martinez through its decisions in Pell, Jones, Bell, and
Block. If this is true, all prisoner cases will be subject to the Turner
reasonableness test.
Until the controversy over the future viability of Martinez is re-
solved, prisoners will likely frame their complaints to show that the
rights of non-prisoners are also being affected. If this can be shown,
prison officials will have to prove not only that the regulation has an
important or substantial governmental interest, but also that it is not
needlessly broad.251 Thus, not only does the strict scrutiny standard
place the burden of proof on the prison officials, it also makes the means
chosen to implement the regulation the central issue.25 2 This approach,
however, can only be utilized in cases that also affect non-prisoners'
rights. Since the vast majority of cases will not fall into this category, 2 3
the reality is that, for the most part, the highly manipulable Turner stan-
dard will govern almost all cases where prisoners claim that a regulation
is unconstitutional.
C. Post Turner Cases
Lower courts have already interpreted the Turner 25 4 standard in-
consistently. The unworkability of the Turner test is demonstrated by
two federal courts of appeal opinions, both of which managed to avoid
the path taken by the Supreme Court in Turner and O'Lone.25 ' This
section reviews two approaches that a pro-prisoners' rights court might
take when faced with possible application of the Turner standard. The
options are: (1) finding that the regulation affects the rights of non-pris-
oners and applying the Martinez strict scrutiny standard; (2) applying
Turner narrowly, calling for a heightened level of proof on the part of the
prison administrators so as to afford greater protection for prisoners.
251. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
252. Id.
253. Most prison regulations are aimed at regulating the conduct of prisoners and will not
directly affect people outside the prison.
254. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
255. Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1572 (1988);
McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987).
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1. Lower court application of Martinez
In Turner, the Supreme Court severely narrowed the applicability of
the Martinez strict scrutiny standard in cases where a prisoner claims
that a prison regulation is unconstitutional. 25 6 The Turner Court con-
cluded that the Martinez strict scrutiny standard was the proper standard
to apply only where "the challenged regulation caused a 'consequential
restriction on the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of those who
are not prisoners.' "257 In these limited situations, where both prisoners'
and non-prisoners' rights are affected by a regulation, the strict scrutiny
standard will be applied, affording a greater degree of protection to the
prisoner.258 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit found Abbott v. Meese "9 to be just such a case.
In Abbott, the Federal Bureau of Prisons260 had enacted a regulation
giving prison wardens the power to deny prisoners the right to receive
certain publications.261 The court applied the Martinez strict scrutiny
standard rather than the Turner reasonableness test.2 62 The court based
its choice of the stricter standard on the fact that the regulation also
affected the first amendment rights of the publishers of the prohibited
material.2 63 The court reasoned that the non-inmate publishers had a
constitutional right to publish.26
In applying the strict scrutiny standard, the court held that the bur-
den of proof was on prison officials to show "a rejection of a publication
is at least 'generally necessary to protect one or more of the legitimate
governmental interests...' of security, order, or rehabilitation.
'2 65
256. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260-62.
257. Id. at 2260 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974)).
258. Id.
259. 824 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1572 (1988).
260. The Federal Bureau of Prisons implements uniform rules with which all wardens must
comply. Id. at 1169.
261. Abbott, 824 F.2d at 1169. Denied publications were of the type that were found to be
"'detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or... [that] might
facilitate criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1987)); see also 28 C.F.R.
§§ 540.70 and 540.71 (b)-(e) (1987).
262. Abbott, 824 F.2d at 1169.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1170. The court, however, failed to distinguish Abbott from Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), where the Supreme Court had applied a reasonableness test to a prison regulation that
had affected publishers' first amendment rights.
265. Abbott, 824 F.2d at 1175 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414 (1974)).
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. Meese v. Abbott, 108 S. Ct. 1572 (1988). It ap-
pears that the Court will either narrow the scope of the Martinez strict scrutiny standard or
completely overrule it.
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The Martinez strict scrutiny standard serves as a greater protection
for prisoners,266 but can only be utilized in a case such as Abbott where
the rights of non-prisoners are also involved.267 More importantly, Ab-
bott demonstrates that by classifying a regulation as one that affects the
rights of non-prisoners, lower courts can avoid applying the Turner test
by manipulating the distinction that the Turner Court drew between
Turner and Martinez.
26 8
2. The manipulability of the Turner test
In many situations, a court can affect the finding of the constitution-
ality of a prison regulation by the type of proof it requires to meet the
standards it deems relevant. As Justice Stevens noted in his separate
opinion in Turner, "[h]ow a court describes its standard of review when a
prison regulation infringes fundamental constitutional rights often has
far less consequence for the inmates than the actual showing that the
court demands of the State in order to uphold the regulation. ' 269 The
point is more evident when we compare the showing the Turner Court
required (for both the marriage and the correspondence regulations),
with the showing required in McCabe v. Arave,270 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the prison regulation
unconstitutional.27'
One of the regulations at issue in McCabe limited inmates to ten
books and ten magazines at one time.2 72 Some prisoners, who were
members of the Church Jesus Christ Christian (CJCC), claimed that this
regulation, along with the prison's practice of not allowing the storage of
CJCC literature in the chapel library, violated their first amendment
right to freedom of worship.273
Applying the Turner standard, the court of appeals held that the
regulation was constitutionally invalid.2 74 The McCabe court's applica-
tion of the various prongs of the Turner standard, while entirely logical,
demonstrates that the way a court applies the standard, rather than any-
thing inherent in the standard itself, determines whether a given regula-
266. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
267. See Abbott, 824 F.2d at 1169.
268. Id.
269. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2267 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
270. 827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987).
271. Id. at 638.
272. Id. at 637.
273. Id.




Under the first prong of the Turner test, the McCabe court reasoned
that the regulation, insofar as it banned all CJCC books from the chapel
library, had no logical connection to a legitimate governmental inter-
est.276 The court noted that although some content regulation is allowed
in a prison,2 77 the Supreme Court has stated that the absence of content
regulation is an important factor in upholding regulations that affect
prisoners' first amendment rights.2 78 The McCabe court concluded that
although books espousing violence or illegal activity could be banned
from the library, those preaching racism or racial purity could not.279
The regulation was thus too restrictive to have a valid and logical con-
nection to the government's interest in security.2"'
Although this interpretation of the first factor of the Turner stan-
dard is certainly reasonable, it seems contrary to the Supreme Court's
application of the same factor in Turner.2"' In Turner, the correspon-
dence regulation banned prisoners from writing any letters to each other
because of the fear that they might write in code to plan escapes. 28 2 The
regulation, however, was arguably overbroad, for prison officials did not
search for letters encouraging escapes, but rather, banned all prison-to-
prison correspondence. 283 The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the
regulation had a valid and logical connection to a legitimate penological
interest.284 Since the first Turner factor does not define how narrowly
tailored a regulation must be to be logical, the McCabe interpretation
may be valid although it appears to be contrary to that employed in
Turner.
With respect to the second prong, whether there are alternative
275. Id. at 637-38.
276. I L (citing Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987)).
277. Id; see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 416 (1974) (material that might lead to
violence could be banned); Murphy v. Missouri Dep't. of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252, 1257
(8th Cir. 1987) (Aryan Nation materials which encourage violence or are reasonably likely to
lead to violence because of their racial nature can be banned); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751,
757 (7th Cir. 1976) (Martinez does not prohibit banning of literature if it may reasonably be
thought to encourage violence).
278. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 638 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551 (1979); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974)).
279. Id. Courts have ruled that a prison cannot ban all religious literature merely because it
is racist. Id. (citing Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1976); Long v. Parker,
390 F.2d 816, 822 (3rd Cir. 1968)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2263.
282. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263.
283. Id. at 2272 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284. Id. at 2264.
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
means of exercising a right that remains open to inmates,285 the right to
read twenty to forty books could have been viewed as only a small part of
one's religious expression. The McCabe court, however, defined the pris-
oner's right narrowly, viewing it as the right to read twenty to forty
books dealing with CJCC doctrine.28 6 By defining the right in this way,
rather than as the right to engage in religious practices, the court con-
cluded that no viable alternatives existed.287 By contrast, the Turner
Court upheld the correspondence regulation by defining the right
broadly, as communication, and concluded that the right to communi-
cate with other prisoners was just a small part of the right of communica-
tion.288 Similarly, in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,289 the Supreme Court
described the right to attend Jumu'ah, a central religious ceremony, to be
just one aspect of expressing religious faith.290 The right in McCabe
could have been defined just as broadly. The right to read twenty to
forty books could have been viewed as only a small part of one's religious
expression. The McCabe application, however, is perfectly consistent
with the Turner test, as the second Turner prong does not define the
scope of an asserted constitutional right.291
Similarly, in considering whether there were ready alternatives to
the regulation, the Turner Court placed credence in the statement that it
would be an impossible task to sort through all the prisoner-to-prisoner
mail.2 92 The McCabe court, however, concluded that there was no prob-
lem with storing the C0CC literature in the chapel library and was seem-
ingly indifferent to the time it might take to sort books that were violent
from those that were merely racist or preaching racial purity.293 This
would certainly seem to be a more time consuming task than the one
rejected in Turner.294 In Turner, the prison staff would have to read only
letters, whereas in McCabe, the prison staff would have to read entire
books. Although letters may need to be reviewed more often, new addi-
tions to the library would call for a constant reviewing process.
The Turner Court found that if the prison staff was required to read
all the mail, the impact on staff resources would be considerable.295 The
285. Id. at 2262.
286. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 638.
287. Id.
288. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263.
289. 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
290. Id. at 2406.
291. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
292. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2264 (citing 3 Record at 159 and 4 Record at 42-43).
293. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 638.
294. See Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2273 n.12.
295. Id. at 2263-64.
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Court assumed this fact to be true without providing any statistical
data.2 96 In fact, this assumption ran contrary to testimony that indicated
scanning all incoming prisoner-to-prisoner mail, along with some outgo-
ing mail, only took one hour a day.29 7 In McCabe, the court, without
explanation, found that impact on guards and other prison resources
would be minimal.298 Again, the Turner test does not define what consti-
tutes a substantial impact on prison staff and how much information is
necessary to support such a conclusion.299 Thus, the test gives considera-
ble flexibility to the courts.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the result in McCabe, one
must acknowledge the fact that there are many inconsistencies in the way
the reasonableness standard was applied in McCabe and in Turner.3 "o
McCabe establishes that the Turner test can be applied to provide protec-
tion for prisoners.3 01 McCabe also exemplifies, however, that it may not
be the strength of one's claim, but the bias of the particular court that
hears it, that affects whether a prisoner's constitutional rights will be pro-
tected.3°2 This inconsistency constitutes the greatest single flaw of the
Turner test and has already resulted in inconsistent rulings throughout
the lower courts.30 3 The extent to which rights are infringed, as well as
the degree of impact on prisoners and staff, should affect the amount of
deference a court gives to prison officials. The Turner test fails to distin-
guish situations which call for different levels of scrutiny. In applying a
low level of review, while using variables that are normally associated
with heightened scrutiny, the Court has invited confusion. It is no won-
der that the lower courts have failed to apply the standard consistently.
Unless the Supreme Court is prepared to review a great number of pris-
oners' rights cases, the development of a new standard is mandated.
D. An Alternative Test
1. The Abdul Wali approach
a reasonableness test
In formulating its own reasonableness test, the majority in Turner v.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 2273 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 638.
299. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
300. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 637-38; Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262-67.
301. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 637-38.
302. Id.
303. See, eg., McCabe, 827 F.2d at 637-38; Abbott, 824 F.2d at 1169-70.
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Safley 304 implicitly rejected the tripartite standard developed by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin. 5
The Abdul Wall standard varies the degree of scrutiny that a prison regu-
lation receives depending on'"the nature of the right being asserted by
prisoners, the type of activity in which they seek to engage, and whether
the challenged restriction works a total deprivation.., on the exercise of
that right. ' ' 30 6 If a regulation does not completely deprive a prisoner
from exercising a right, or if the activity that prisoners seek to engage in
is presumptively dangerous, the Abdul Wall test provides that the prison
regulation will be invalidated only if "the restriction is not supported by
a reasonable justification., 30 7 This gives appropriate deference to prison
officials, allowing them to make rules necessary to efficiently run their
institutions.
b. strict scrutiny standard
The greatest advantage of the Abdul Wali test is that it furnishes the
court with an opportunity to apply different levels of scrutiny depending
on the situation. 08 The variance of scrutiny allows prison officials to run
their institutions effectively while still protecting prisoners' fundamental
constitutional rights. However, when a prisoner seeks to engage in an
activity that is not presumptively dangerous, and where the regulation
completely deprives the prisoner of that right, the strict scrutiny test ap-
plies and prison officials must then show that "a particular restriction is
necessary to further an important governmental interest, and that the
limitations on freedom occasioned by the restriction are no greater than
necessary to effectuate the governmental objective involved."30 9 Thus,
where a prisoner is completely deprived of a right, the Abdul Wall test
calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard.310
c. Turner implicitly rejects Abdul Wali
The prison officials in Turner implied that the Abdul Wall test was
unworkable.3" They claimed that such a test would force courts to de-
termine whether an activity was dangerous and, based upon that deter-
304. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
305. 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
306. Id. at 1033.
307. Id.
308. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
309. Id.; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
310. Abdul Wai, 754 F.2d at 1033.
311. Brief for Petitioners at 25, Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (No. 85-1384).
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mination, that one of two standards would be applied.312 Prison officials
argued that this would require courts to guess whether the situation was
dangerous enough to warrant a restriction.313
There are two substantial flaws in the prison officials' reasoning.
First, where the state's rationale for curtailing an inmate's right to en-
gage in an activity is based on a theory of dangerousness, prison adminis-
trators are required to have a valid basis for believing the activity to be
dangerous. By forewarning a prison official that a court may scrutinize
the rationale for enacting a regulation, the official will be more likely to
enact regulations that in fact relate to dangerous activity. This will give
prison officials the ability to deal effectively with real problems, and at
the same time, will protect prisoners' constitutional rights.
The prison officials' argument that the Abdul Wall test is unwork-
able, because it would force courts to decide whether an activity is dan-
gerous, 314 also lacks merit. Under Turner's four-part reasonableness test,
it is a court which will decide "the impact accommodation of the as-
serted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources generally., 315 Thus, not only does the
Turner test require a court to judge the impact of asserting a right, but it
requires a court to determine whether the impact will be substantial.31 6
The Turner test also instructs courts to determine whether there are
other means of exercising the regulated right, whether there are alterna-
tives to the challenged regulation and whether there is a valid connection
between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest.
317 If
courts can competently make all four of these complex determinations in
a given case, it follows that they are qualified to determine Abdul Wali's
threshold question of whether the assertion of a given right is
dangerous. 18
A further criticism leveled at the Abdul Wali standard was that the
use of the strict scrutiny standard shifts the burden of proof from the
prisoners to the prison officials.319 Prison administrators argued that
they "cannot produce bleeding bodies to demonstrate the effectiveness of




315. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Abdul Wal, 754 F.2d at 1033.
319. Brief for Petitioners at 25, Turner (No. 85-1384).
320. Id. at 26.
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Under the Abdul Wali test, prison officials would only be required to
show that in the past, exertion of the right has been dangerous or, if the
right has never been exerted, that the exertion of the right at other pris-
ons has proved dangerous. 32 1 This could be accomplished by either
pointing to past problems at the prison or to problems in other institu-
tions that lack a similar restriction. If there is truly a legitimate reason
for enacting a rule, there should be some extrinsic information to support
it. Since prison officials will often be the only persons with access to such
information, it is appropriate that they should have the burden of pro-
ducing it.
Under the Abdul Wali test, this proof would only be necessary
where a regulation completely deprives a prisoner from exercising a pro-
tected right, and where it does not appear on its face that it is regulating
an activity that is inherently dangerous.
3 22
Thus, in either the situation where a prisoner's actions are inher-
ently dangerous, or where a prison needs to enact a restriction aimed at
partially limiting the expression of a right, the prison regulation will be
subjected to the highly deferential reasonableness test.323
d. advantages of Abdul Wall
In a prison, where efficiency is critical to the running of a safe insti-
tution, prison officials should have the ability to promulgate regulations
that increase efficiency. Where enacting a regulation will allow a prison
official to improve the way the prison is run, the official should have the
leeway to do so. The Abdul Wali test takes this into account by making
the degree of scrutiny a prison regulation receives dependent on the ex-
tent a prisoner's right is deprived.324 Whereas under the Turner test,
when a right is totally deprived, the test does not place any special em-
phasis on the total deprivation, but merely considers it in combination
with the other Turner factors.325 This is inappropriate where a prisoner
is threatened with the complete loss of an exerted right. Rather, prison
officials should be required to show that there are no less restrictive alter-
natives to achieving the desired result.326
The Turner Court failed to show why prison officials should be
given such extreme deference when they threaten to take away a pris-




325. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
326. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
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oner's right. Even if it overburdens prison administrators to show that
something is presumptively dangerous, this in itself, is not enough to jus-
tify the application of the reasonableness test. The Turner-type of bal-
ancing so undervalues a prisoner's right to constitutional protection that
it abuses the concept of deference.327 The proper balance, as established
in Abdul Wali, is not to exalt one approach at the expense of the other,
but to recognize that each approach plays a valid role.328 By choosing
between two tests, depending on the situation, courts strike a proper bal-
ance between aiding the prison officials and protecting the prisoners.
e. Turner or Abdul Wali is there really a difference?
The Turner and Abdul Wali tests are quite similar in several aspects.
Under both tests, a court must determine whether the prohibited activity
is so dangerous that it will have a substantial effect on prisoners and
prison staff.32 9 In addition, a court must decide whether the prisoner's
right has been completely deprived.33 One might conclude that these
standards are equally manipulable and hence produce equal amounts of
uncertainty.
For example, even under Abdul Wali, if a court wants to apply a
mere reasonableness test, it can simply classify the regulation as pertain-
ing to a dangerous condition, or as not working a complete deprivation.
The court could thus consider expression of the right to be dangerous
based on speculative evidence or define the right so broadly that the right
has not been totally deprived. Once the court has classified the regula-
tion in either of these ways, the reasonableness test rather than strict
scrutiny would apply and the regulation would be per se constitu-
tional.331 This argument, however, is simply not persuasive.
Under the Abdul Wall test, it is true that classification of the right
determines the applicability of one standard over the other.332 However,
as the court would not yet be operating under the guise of a specific stan-
dard, during its classification analysis the evidence required would have
327. The minimal level of proof required by the Turner Court places great credence in the
views of prison administrators. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2270-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). This leads to courts underevaluating the relevant evidence, and thus
providing prisoners with very little protection for their constitutional rights.
328. The Abdul Wall court was not favoring either the strict scrutiny standard or the rea-
sonableness test. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033. The court argued for the continued viability
of both standards and the selective application of a test depending on the particular circum-
stances of the case. Id.
329. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262; Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
330. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262; Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
331. Abdul Wali, 754 F.2d at 1033.
332. Id.
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to be based on more than mere speculation. If the prison officials wanted
the regulation to be scrutinized under the more deferential reasonable-
ness test, they would have to demonstrate that exercising the right would
create a dangerous condition, or that the regulation limited rather than
completely deprived a prisoner from exercising a protected right.
Thus, while Turner requires very little evidence of actual danger,
333
under Abdul Wall, proof is the focal point for determining the choice of a
standard.3 34 In further contrast, under the Turner test, the Court in Tur-
ner and O'Lone saw no problem in defining the right so broadly as to
minimize the effect of the regulations on the asserted right.335 Under
Abdul Wali, however, a court would be aware that the distinctions it
draws will mandate the applicability of a particular standard.3 6 An im-
portant aspect of the philosophy of the Abdul Wali test is based on the
difference between a complete deprivation of a right and merely regulat-
ing the way in which it is exerted.337 Therefore, the task of applying a
particular standard will be taken seriously. Given the philosophy of the
test, there will be a presumption in favor of defining the right very
broadly. This will cause courts to be more careful when assessing the
extent to which a right is infringed.
When a prisoner is completely prevented from engaging in an act
which, if undertaken in a non-prison setting would be protected by the
Constitution, he or she should be deemed to have been completely de-
prived of that right and strict scrutiny should apply.338 This does not
mean that the regulation is unconstitutional; it simply mandates a higher
level of scrutiny.
Implementing the Abdul Wali standard will strike the proper bal-
ance between prison officials' need to control their institutions and a pris-
oner's right to constitutional protection. Where prison officials adopt
rules to combat dangerous situations, the regulations would be subjected
to the deferential reasonableness test.3 39 Similarly, where regulations
merely control the manner in which a prisoner may exercise a constitu-
tional right, the reasonableness approach would prevail.340 But where
officials promulgate regulations that completely deprive a prisoner of the
333. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2270-73 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
334. Abdul Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033.
335. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2263; O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2406.







ability to exert a right, the strict scrutiny standard will apply.34 1 The
strict scrutiny standard requires the prison officials to show that the gov-
ernment has an important or substantial interest and that there is no less
restrictive means of achieving the desired result.342 If there is no less
restrictive means, the regulation will be upheld. If, however, there is a
less restrictive alternative, the prison regulation will be found
unconstitutional.
A further advantage of the Abdul Wall standard is that it is likely to
provide a prisoner with a more meaningful review of a court's decision
than the Turner test. Under Turner, a prisoner may obtain a reversal of
the trial court's judgment only if he or she can show that the trial court's
decision was clearly erroneous.343
Under the Abdul Wali test, however, not only- can a prisoner chal-
lenge the application of the standard as clearly erroneous, but a prisoner
can also challenge the initial choice of the standard.3" This will provide
for a more thorough review and a greater source of protection for a pris-
oner's constitutional rights.
The Turner Court, by mandating the use of a single highly deferen-
tial standard for all cases where prisoners claim that their constitutional
rights have been violated, and by labeling that standard the reasonable-
ness test,345 makes it clear that prisoners' rights need not be carefully
guarded. In comparison, the Abdul Wali test symbolizes the notion that
prisoners still have constitutional rights and the scrutiny that a regula-
tion is given should vary depending on the degree a right is deprived.346
f the future of the Turner standard
Turner was not a unanimous decision. In fact, only five Justices
supported the majority opinion,347 including the recently retired Justice
Powell. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Supreme Court split exactly
along the same lines.348 Since Justice Powell is no longer with the Court,
and his replacement, Justice Kennedy, has not yet expressed an opinion
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 146 (1986).
344. Abdul Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033. As the Abdul Wali test calls for a choice between the
reasonableness test and their strict scrutiny standard, a prisoner can argue on appeal that the
wrong standard was applied.
345. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
346. Abdul Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033.
347. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2257. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia joined. Id.
348. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2400.
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in this area, there is some doubt as to the future viability of the Turner
standard.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in O'Lone expressed great satis-
faction with the Abdul Wali standard.349 If Justice Kennedy sides with
the Brennan camp, there will be a five Justice majority on the Court
supporting the Abdul Wall standard and thus, greater predictability and
protection will be provided for a prisoner threatened with the loss of a
valuable constitutional right. If, however, Justice Kennedy joins the
Turner majority, then the protection of prisoners' constitutional rights
will be in jeopardy.
In reviewing prisoners' rights cases, the United States Supreme
Court now has three options. The Court will either (1) refuse to hear
cases in this area, thus tacitly affirming its belief in the Turner standard;
(2) modify the Turner test by reviewing a lower court decision that uses
the standard to protect a prisoner's rights; or (3) grant review in all cases
like Abbott 350 and McCabe35 1 and reverse lower courts, holding that
they misapplied Turner, without modifying the Turner test itself.
Thus, although the Turner test can be criticized for its deference to
prison officials and its ready manipulability, its manipulative nature can
allow a sympathetic court to closely guard prisoners' constitutional
rights. If the test is modified to become more like the traditional rational
basis test,352 then the Turner Court's highly restrictive interpretation of
prisoners' constitutional rights will become universal. Although the Ab-
dul Walt test surely makes the most sense in terms of protecting the
rights of both prison officials and prisoners, whether it will become the
chosen measure of interpretation will depend on the views of Justice
Kennedy, as well as the Supreme Court's reaction to cases like Abbott
and McCabe.
V. PROPOSAL
A. .4 Modified Abdul Wali Approach
Although the Abdul Wall v. Coughlin 3 3 standard is more protective
349. Id. at 2407 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
350. For a discussion of Abbott, see supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
351. For a discussion of McCabe, see supra notes 272-99 and accompanying text.
352. Under the rational basis test, the court examines whether the legislative enactment is
rationally related to achieving the stated statutory purpose. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Cream-
ery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 462-63 (1981). The court need not find that the legislative enactment
will correct the asserted problem, but rather, that it might correct the problem. Id. at 464.
353. 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
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of prisoners' constitutional rights than the Turner v. Safley 354 test, it is
not without its problems. For the Abdul Wall standard to function effec-
tively, a court must respect the balancing philosophy upon which the test
was based. If a court is biased in favor of finding that a regulation is
valid, it may not accept the presumption that a particular right should be
defined narrowly.3"' By defining a right broadly, the court can classify
the regulation as only affecting a small part of that right, thus finding
only a partial deprivation. In these circumstances, a court would apply
the reasonableness test and prisoners would receive no greater protection
than under Turner.
Both the Abdul Wall test and the Turner test focus on whether a
right has been completely deprived.35 6 This concept is highly manipula-
ble. The degree of deprivation a court finds will depend on how broadly
or narrowly the right is defined. If the right is framed narrowly, a court
will be more likely to find a complete deprivation. Since courts define the
parameters of a particular right, they can easily manipulate the concept
of complete deprivation.
The Abdul Wali test was created to strike a proper balance between
the competing goals of giving flexibility to prison administrators and pro-
tecting prisoners' constitutional rights.357 Nevertheless, the complete
deprivation requirement runs counter to Abdul Wall's intended purpose,
as it is subject to manipulation. Rather than asking whether there has
been a complete deprivation, the proper question should be whether
there has been a substantial deprivation.358
A substantial deprivation requirement will force courts to compare
the degree of activity that the regulation forecloses with that which it
permits. When a prisoner is deprived of a significant portion of a consti-
tutional right, the regulation should be carefully scrutinized. Under the
modified Abdul Wall test, the strict scrutiny standard will apply where
there is a substantial deprivation of a constitutional right. This will pro-
vide a greater source of protection and predictability for inmates, because
it will be much easier for a prisoner and his or her counsel to decide
whether there has been a substantial deprivation, rather than a complete
deprivation. If the regulation merely restricts the manner in which a
354. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
355. Abdul Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033.
356. Id.; Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
357. Abdul Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033.
358. The Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances where a law substantially
impinges on protected conduct a heightened level of scrutiny should be applied. See Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (first amendment), see also Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (right to privacy).
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right is expressed, however, or if the activity in which prisoners seek to
engage is presumptively dangerous, the prison regulation will be invali-
dated only if "the restriction is not supported by a reasonable justifica-
tion."3 9  This will provide prison officials with the flexibility to
effectively run their institutions. The modified Abdul Wali standard will
therefore strike the balance that Abdul Wall sought to achieve. The
modified Abdul Wall approach will not only give deference to prison offi-
cials but will also protect prisoners' constitutional rights.
B. Application of the modified Abdul Wali approach
The benefits of the modified Abdul Wall approach can be best exem-
plified by hypothesizing how the test would have been applied to three
cases previously discussed. In OLone v. Estate of Shabazz,36 Moslem
prisoners objected to two prison regulations, claiming that the regula-
tions affected their ability to take part in the prayer activities of
Jumu'ah.361 The .Supreme Court upheld the validity of the regula-
tions. 362 The Court reasoned that prisoners were not deprived of all
forms of religious expression, for they could still engage in prayer and
discussion during non-working hours. 63
Under the modified Abdul Wall standard, depriving prisoners of the
right to attend Jumu'ah, the central religious ceremony of their faith,
would certainly have been considered a substantial deprivation. 3 4 Since
the prisoners were completely forbidden from attending Jumu'ah, the de-
gree of deprivation caused by the regulation would have been found to
outweigh that which it permitted. Thus, the prisoners would have been
entitled to have a court scrutinize the regulations under the strict scru-
tiny standard.
In McCabe v. Arave,365 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found a prison regulation that limited inmates to ten books and ten
magazines to be unconstitutional. 66 Some prisoners who were members
of the Church Jesus Christ Christian (CJCC) claimed that this regulation
along with the prison's practice of not allowing CJCC literature to be
stored in the chapel library, violated their first amendment right to reli-
359. Abdul Wal, 754 F.2d at 1033.
360. 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
361. Id. at 2402-03.
362. Id. at 2407.
363. Id. at 2406. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
364. O'Lone, 107 S. Ct. at 2410 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
365. 827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987).
366. Id. at 637.
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gious expression.367 Because the church strongly suggested that all mem-
bers read between twenty to forty books, the court viewed the ten book
limit as a complete deprivation of that right.368
The Ninth Circuit used the Turner test to protect prisoner's
rights.369 In light of O'Lone, however, where the Supreme Court found
Jumu'ah to be just one aspect of religious expression, 371 the Supreme
Court undoubtedly would have held the regulation in McCabe to be con-
stitutional. Thus, in McCabe strict scrutiny was applied only because the
McCabe court was favorable toward prisoners' constitutional rights.37'
Under the modified Abdul Wali approach, a regulation that limits
prisoners to ten books would be a substantial deprivation of the right to
practice the CJCC religion. As CJCC recommends that all members
read twenty to forty books, a prisoner who could only read ten CJCC
books could not adequately practice the religiof.372 Since the reading
requirement is integral to the religion, the degree of activity the regula-
tion forecloses would certainly outweigh that which it permits. Due to
this substantial deprivation, the strict scrutiny standard would have been
applied.
The modified Abdul Wali test as hypothetically applied to both Mc-
Cabe and O'Lone demonstrates that in certain situations courts would
find it difficult to hold that a right was not substantially deprived. In
cases such as these, the deprivation is substantial because the expression
of the particular right is central to the expression of the entire right.
Therefore, there is little room for a court to manipulate the standard to
conform to its particular views regarding prisoners' constitutional rights.
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court found a regulation prohibit-
ing prisoners from writing to non-family inmates in other institutions to
be constitutional.373 The Court found that there were alternative means
of exercising the right by defining the right broadly, as "all means of
expression. ' 374 The Court then concluded that only one small part of a
prisoner's right to communicate was barred: the right to communicate




368. Id. at 638.
369. Id.
370. OLone, 107 S. Ct. at 2406.
371. McCabe, 827 F.2d at 638.
372. Id.
373. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2264.
374. Id. at 2263.
375. Id.
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Under the modified Abdul Wali test, the question would have been
whether the regulation deprived prisoners of a substantial portion of
their right to communicate. To answer this question a court would have
needed more information about what percentage of an inmate's corre-
spondence is inmate-inmate related. Under this standard, however, pris-
oners in Turner would have had a better chance to prove a sufficient
deprivation.
If a court defines the right broadly, under the Turner test it is almost
impossible for a prisoner to show complete deprivation of a right. Under
the modified Abdul Walt test, however, a prisoner still has an opportu-
nity to show that the deprivation is such a substantial part of the right,
that without its expression, the right is almost meaningless. One must
recognize, however, that when the right is not as obviously substantial, as
in O'Lone or McCabe, there is still some room for manipulation by the
courts. Even with this in mind, however, the modified Abdul Wall test
serves as a greater source of protection for prisoners' constitutional
rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Turner v. Safley, 76 the United States Supreme Court adopted a
single test to scrutinize all claims that a regulation has violated a pris-
oner's constitutional right.377 Although the idea is novel, it is misguided,
as it assumes that a single standard can adequately protect all prisoners'
claims. As Justice Brennan stated, "[i]f a directive that officials act 'rea-
sonably' were deemed sufficient to check all exercises of power, the Con-
stitution would hardly be necessary.
'378
Moreover, the Turner Court adds confusion to the area of prisoners'
constitutional rights by adopting a four-prong approach designed to test
the reasonableness of a penal regulation.3 79 The requirements of this test
become meaningless if they can be satisfied by providing evidence based
on mere speculation. The Turner standard is so flexible that it effectively
allows a court to use it to support its own personal views. Since this will
produce a lack of uniformity among the lower courts, the Turner test as
presently structured is simply unworkable.
With the retirement of Justice Powell and the arrival of Justice Ken-
nedy, the viability of the Turner standard is uncertain. One can only
hope that for the benefit of prisoners, lawyers, and our society as a whole,
376. 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
377. Id. at 2261.
378. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
379. Turner, 107 S. Ct. 2262.
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the Court overrules Turner v. Safley and adopts a more sensible standard
based on the test formulated in Abdul Wall v. Coughlin.38 0
William Mark Roth*
380. 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985).
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